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Abstract 
 
This is the first paper that assesses the importance of different stabilization channels of an 
unemployment insurance system for the euro area (EA). We provide insights on the potential 
added value of common unemployment insurance (UI) as a fiscal risk sharing device which 
crucially hinges on its ability to provide interregional smoothing. Running counterfactual 
simulations based on micro data for the period 2000-13, we found that 10 percent of the income 
fluctuations due to transitions into and out of un-employment would have been cushioned 
through inter-regional smoothing at EA-level. Smoothing gains are unevenly distributed across 
countries, ranging from -5 percent in Malta to 22 percent in Latvia. Our results suggest that the 
inter-regional smoothing potential is as important as intertemporal smoothing through debt. We 
found that four member states would have been either a permanent net contributor or net 
recipient. Contingent benefits could limit the degree of cross-country redistribution, but might 
reduce desired insurance effects. We also study heterogeneous effects within countries and 
discuss moral hazard issues at the level of individuals, the administration and economic policy. 
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1 Introduction
The Great Recession and the resulting European debt crisis have revived the debate
about deeper scal integration in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
The EMU is an atypical monetary union because monetary policy is decided at the cen-
tral (European) level while scal policy is carried out at the sub-central (member-state)
level (Bordo et al. 2013).1 Some observers argue that national automatic stabilizers
provided insu¢ cient income insurance during the crisis as some EMU member states
lost access to private capital markets and conclude that common scal stabilization
mechanisms are necessary to make EMU more sustainable and more resilient against
asymmetric macroeconomic shocks (Bertola 2013, IMF 2013). The main concerns in
this debate relate to the issues of permanent transfer ows within the currency union
and moral hazard. In particular, national governments might neglect structural reforms
or scal consolidation.
How could a scal risk sharing mechanism in the euro area be designed? In the
so-called Four PresidentsReport published in 2012, the former President of the Eu-
ropean Council, Herman van Rompuy, has suggested the following: An EMU scal
capacity with a limited asymmetric shock absorption function could take the form of
an insurance-type system between euro area countries. [...] The specic design of such
a function could follow two broad approaches. The rst would be a macroeconomic
approach, where contributions and disbursements would be based on uctuations in
cyclical revenue and expenditure items [...]. The second could be based on a micro-
economic approach, and be more directly linked to a specic public function sensitive
to the economic cycle, such as unemployment insurance.(Van Rompuy 2012). The
European Commission and more recently Jean-Claude Juncker in the Five Presidents
report built upon this initiative with own blueprints for the EMU (European Commis-
sion 2012, Juncker 2015).
Since then, the perspectives of a European scal union and di¤erent reform pro-
posals along the lines of the Four Presidents report have been analyzed in various
studies.2 For the macroeconomic approach, suggestions include a cyclical shock ab-
sorber based on output gaps (Enderlein et al. 2013) and a stabilization fund for the
1In the following we equivalently use EA, EMUand Eurozone to refer to the 18 member
states of the European Currency Union that had introduced the euro in 2014.
2First analyses of potential insurance e¤ects if the EMU were more scally integrated date back
to the introduction of the euro (Fatás 1998 and Forni and Reichlin 1999), adding to the vast literature
on insurance e¤ects in existing scal federations such as the US (see e.g. Bayoumi and Masson 1995
and Asdrubali et al. 1996). More recent contributions include Bargain et al. (2013) who analyze the
economic implications of a fully integrated European tax and transfer system and a scal equalization
mechanism based on taxing capacity and expenditure needs for 11 founding members of the euro
area, and Feyrer and Sacerdote (2013) who ask to what extent economic shocks would be absorbed
by the center if the EU were as scally integrated as the US. The question of how to optimally design
insurance mechanisms and the political economy of scal unions have also gained renewed interest in
the more theoretical literature (cf. Evers 2012, Farhi and Werning 2014, Luque et al. 2014).
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euro area (Furceri and Zdzienicka 2015). For the microeconomic approach, the discus-
sion has focused on the idea of a common EMU-wide unemployment insurance system
(henceforth EMU-UI) as proposed among others by Deinzer (2004), Dullien (2014) and
Andor (2014).3
This is the rst paper that assesses the importance of di¤erent stabilization chan-
nels of an EMU-UI system. We develop a decomposition framework that provides
insights on the potential added value of an EMU-UI scheme. We argue that this value
added crucially hinges on the ability of this scheme to provide interregional smoothing.
Interregional smoothing is dened as follows. We decompose the e¤ect of introducing
an EMU-UI system into three steps. The rst is to harmonize national systems, that
is all member countries introduce an unemployment insurance scheme with common
features, which will be discussed further below. The second step is to introduce a
common EMU-UI scheme by pooling the contributions from all member states in every
year and to nance unemployment benets from this pool, using the same contribution
rates in all countries. This step leads to interregional smoothing of unemployment
shocks. The third step is to allow the EMU-UI system to run decits or surpluses.
This leads to intertemporal smoothing. The rst and the third step do change the
stabilizing e¤ects of the unemployment insurance systems but these changes can be
achieved, in principle, by countries acting alone. The key contribution of introduc-
ing an EMU-wide unemployment insurance scheme is to o¤er interregional smoothing,
that is to o¤er insurance against unemployment shocks that a¤ect the di¤erent mem-
ber countries di¤erently. Running counterfactual simulations for the period 200013,
we isolate and quantify harmonization e¤ects as well as interregional and intertem-
poral smoothing e¤ects for euro area member states (EA-18). Methodologically, we
rely on a micro data approach and simulate a sample of repeated cross-sections for
each member state combining micro data from the EU Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions (EU-SILC) and the EU Labor Force Survey (EU-LFS). We evalute stabiliz-
ing and redistributive e¤ects of various basicEMU-UI schemes that cover short-term
unemployment and partly replace national UI systems. We also explore the e¤ects of
experience rating, compare the basic EMU-UI scheme to a variant with contingent,
i.e., trigger-based benet payments, and study within-country heterogeneity.4 In ad-
dition to the empirical exercise, our paper provides a comprehensive and systematic
analysis of a wide range of design options for an EMU-UI system. We discuss various
3See also IAB (2013), Centre for European Policy Studies (2014), Dullien et al. (2014) and Lellouch
and Sode (2014). Claeys et al. (2014) provide an overview of policy challenges associated with an
EMU-UI system.
4Brandolini et al. (2016) and Jara and Sutherland (2014) also use micro data to analyze an EMU-UI
system. The focus of their analyses di¤ers from ours as in contrast to this study, the former considers
a notional EMU-UI system backing national UI systems and thus disregards EMU-UI transfers at
the micro level, while the latter assumes EMU-UI benets to top up national benets if minimum
requirements are not met by national UI systems. In addition, these papers cover shorter time periods
and fewer countries than our paper.
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concerns and potential adverse e¤ects of an EMU-UI system, in particular the view
that such a system would lead to a transfer union in Europe and moral hazard issues.
Importantly, the aim of the paper is not to serve as a policy proposal but rather as
a conceptual experiment, providing general insights into the e¤ects of various design
options for a basic EMU-UI.
Our main results are as follows. We nd that a basic EMU-UI scheme with a
replacement rate of 50 per cent, a maximum duration of benet receipt of 12 months
and a broad coverage of all new unemployed with previous employment income would
have provided interregional smoothing gains by cushioning 10 per cent of the income
uctuations due to transitions into and out of unemployment at EA-level. Interregional
smoothing e¤ects are unevenly distributed across member states, ranging from -5 per
cent in Malta to 22 per cent in Latvia. Overall, 17 out of 18 member states would have
been stabilized through interregional smoothing. At the same time we nd procyclical
e¤ects in some years for most countries. Our results suggest that the interregional
smoothing potential is as e¤ective as intertemporal smoothing through debt. The
latter provides an additional cushioning e¤ect of 9 per cent at EA-level. In terms of
budgetary e¤ects, the simulated basic EMU-UI scheme could be implemented with a
relatively small annual budget. Over the period 200013, average benets would have
amounted to roughly 47 billion euro per year, nanced by a uniform contribution rate
across member states of 1.56 per cent on employment income. The scheme is not
designed to give rise to permanent redistribution across countries because only short-
term (rather than structural) unemployment is insured. Nevertheless our simulations
reveal that a small number of member states would have been net contributors or net
recipients in each year of our simulation period. Largest net contributors are Austria,
Germany and the Netherlands with average yearly net contributions of 0.19-0.39 per
cent of GDP. Latvia and Spain are the largest net recipients (average yearly net benets
of 0.36 and 0.54 per cent of GDP).
Turning next to within-country heterogeneity, we nd the largest coverage and
stabilization gains for the young and, perhaps surprisingly, also for high-skilled un-
employed. The reason for the former is that the young often do not meet eligibility
conditions of national UI while they are covered by the simulated EMU-UI. The result
for the high-skilled is due to a higher proportion of short-term relative to long-term
unemployed (who are not eligible to EMU-UI) among them.
Finally, we consider a contingent benet scheme which is activated if the unem-
ployment rate in a given member state is 1 percentage point higher than in one of the
previous three years. Under this system no member state would have been in a per-
manent net contributing/receiving position. With 22 billion euro per year, the overall
budget and thus the amount of cross-country redistribution would have been less than
half as large as under the non-contingent scheme in the baseline.
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The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we discuss di¤erent alternatives how
a common EMU-UI system could be designed. In addition, we present key features
of the simulated EMU-UI schemes. Section 3 describes the empirical framework of
the analysis. The decomposition approach and main results are presented in section
4. Alternative EMU-UI schemes with experience rating and contingent benets are
analyzed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Possible characteristics of an EMU-UI system
Design options. A common unemployment insurance system for the euro area could
be designed in various ways. Three key options have been discussed in the literature
and in the policy debate so far. A rst option would be a common EMU-UI system
that provides a basic level of insurance by partly replacing national unemployment
insurance systems. Benets from the euro area system could be topped up by addi-
tional payments from national unemployment insurance systems. Hence, there would
be room for diversity across member states so that existing di¤erences with regard to
replacement rates and benet duration could be preserved. The EMU-UI system would
be nanced by social insurance contributions with a contribution rate that could be
uniform across Eurozone member states or country-specic and time-variant to restrict
cross-country transfers. An important feature of such a scheme is that it would provide
income insurance to the unemployed (under certain eligibility conditions) irrespective
of the size of the unemployment shock in a given member state. As an alternative, a
common scheme could provide income stabilization only in the event of large (unem-
ployment) shocks. Such contingent unemployment benets would be triggered if the
level and/or change in overall unemployment has reached a pre-determined threshold
in a given period.5 National unemployment insurance systems would still be in place in
normal times. As a third option, the euro area unemployment insurance scheme could
complement national systems by providing additional transfers which would either top
up national benets or kick in if national benets expire. The payout rules of this
scheme could be trigger-based as well. Such a system would be comparable to the US
unemployment insurance system where regular state benets can be complemented by
two types of benets extension programs which are at least partly provided by the
federal government, the Extended Benet program (EB) and emergency benets.6
5Note that such an EMU-UI system with contingent benets could also be designed as a rein-
surance scheme where national UI systems stay in place and there are no direct transfers from the
EMU-UI system to the unemployed, but nancial ows between the European fund and national UI
systems (Gros 2014 and Dolls et al. 2016). Alternative triggers for the activation of the scheme could
be the short-term unemployment rate or the insured unemployment rate which is used in the US un-
employment insurance system (besides the total unemployment rate) as a trigger for benet extension
programs (Nicholson et al. 2014).
6Cf. Congressional Budget O¢ ce (2012) and Nicholson et al. (2014). Note that in the US regular
state benets are paid for a period which usually lasts not longer than 6 months. The large extensions
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Concerns. A major concern with an EMU-UI system is that it would lead to
permanent transfers across euro area member states. How do the three variants for
an EMU-UI system di¤er with regard to the risk of permanent redistribution? A
basic EMU-UI scheme would not be designed to generate permanent redistribution
because such a scheme conditions on changes in employment status rather than on
unemployment levels. Di¤erences in unemployment rates alone do not (necessarily)
lead to permanent redistribution because benets would be targeted to cyclical (short-
time) unemployment and would expire after a certain time span. It may nevertheless
happen that (net) transfers are unevenly distributed across member states if ows into
unemployment diverge permanently or if there are permanent di¤erences in the level of
short-term unemployment.7 This risk could be reduced by claw-back mechanisms based
on experience rating or if transfers were trigger-based as under the contingent benet
scheme. Clearly, redistributive e¤ects of the former (latter) scheme would depend on
the exact claw-back mechanism (choice of the trigger). The risk of permanent transfers
would be high with an EMU-UI scheme that provides extended benets after national
unemployment benets expire because such a scheme would be likely to cover not only
cyclical, but also structural unemployment. Moreover, it could incentivize governments
to cut national unemployment insurance benets as the EMU-UI system would step
in.
A further concern is related to various types of moral hazard. A common EMU-
UI system could undermine incentives for national governments to address structural
weaknesses of the labor market. One counterargument is that national governments
would still bear the cost of long-term unemployment under a basic, contingent or
non-contingent EMU-UI system. This argument is much weaker, however, with an
extended benet program which is likely to cover structural unemployment as well.
Moreover, incentives to pursue policies that reduce short term unemployment such
as public support for reduced working hour schemes during crises could be adversely
a¤ected by an EMU-UI system because the cost of short-term unemployment would
be borne by the common pool.
Additional concerns relate to other moral hazard issues including administrative
manipulation and adverse incentive e¤ects at the individual level with regard to job
search and labor supply. National administrations would have incentives to use their
discretion to increase the number of benet recipients. Incentives to manipulate would
depend on the characteristics of the system, e.g. the required employment period or
a waiting period for EMU-UI benets. Increasing the length of these periods would
make administrative manipulation more di¢ cult, but longer periods would also reduce
of unemployment insurance provided by the US federal government in the 2009-12 period increased
the benet duration to 99 weeks in many US states. Unemployment benets in the EMU are usually
granted much longer than regular state benets in the US (Esser et al. 2013).
7Economies where seasonal employment like in tourism plays an important role would be likely to
have larger ows into and out of unemployment.
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desired insurance e¤ects. Moral hazard e¤ects at the individual level depend on the
overall benet level (EMU plus national benets) and duration relative to the status
quo. The e¤ect of a common EMU-UI system on migration responses in case of unem-
ployment is ambiguous. Improved portability of unemployment benet claims might
increase the willingness to migrate and to search for a job in a member state with bet-
ter labor market conditions. But if EMU-UI benets are more generous than national
benets incentives for active job search could be diminished.
Key features of the simulated EMU-UI schemes. The current debate focuses
on a basic EMU-UI system (contingent and non-contingent) as the risk of permanent
transfers and moral hazard issues are perceived to be less severe compared to an ex-
tended benet system. In the baseline scenario, we therefore focus on a basic, non-
contingent EMU-UI scheme with a replacement rate of 50 per cent of previous gross
earnings and a broad coverage of the short-term unemployed.8 Eligible to EMU-UI
benets are all short-term unemployed with previous employment income for a period
of up to 12 months. The scheme is nanced by social insurance contributions with a
uniform contribution rate across member states. We simulate EMU-UI schemes that
are calibrated to be revenue-neutral at the Eurozone-level (but not the member-state
level) either in every year (no debt issuance) or over the simulation period (possibility
of debt issuance). A comparison of these schemes indicates the intertemporal smooth-
ing potential of the EMU-UI system (section 4.1). For the analysis of redistributive
e¤ects across member states, we simulate further schemes with di¤erent coverage rates
and generosity levels. Additionally, we consider two alternative scenarios. In the rst,
we impose revenue-neutrality at the member-state level (experience rating) which is
equivalent to harmonizing national UI systems. In the second, we make the EMU-UI
scheme trigger-based (contingent benets). The analysis of redistributive properties of
these additional scenarios is an important extension to the previous literature because
they are often assumed to alleviate the risk of permanent redistribution and moral
hazard issues.
3 Data and methodology
Di¤erent methodological approaches for an analysis of the economic e¤ects of an EMU-
UI system are possible. While previous research has mainly used aggregate macro level
8The choice of the replacement rate is motivated by Esser et al. (2013) who show that the average
gross replacement rate of Eurozone countries was roughly 50 per cent in 2010. This is on average
equivalent to a replacement rate of 71 per cent of net income. To be precise, it corresponds to a
replacement rate of 71.4 per cent applied to 70 per cent of gross income, i.e., taking into account the
average share of income taxes and social insurance contributions in the euro area. A key advantage of
applying the replacement rate to gross rather than net earnings is that in the former case the generosity
of the scheme is not a¤ected by the size (and progressivity) of national net taxes (income taxes, social
insurance contributions and cash benets) which vary considerably across euro area member states.
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data, we rely on representative household micro data for the EA18 using EUROMOD, a
static tax-benet calculator for the European Union countries. EUROMOD is mainly
based on cross-sectional micro data from the EU Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions (EU-SILC) released by Eurostat (Eurostat 2012) which we combine with
micro data from the EU Labor Force Survey (EU-LFS).9 The key advantage of our
approach in the present context is that we exploit both detailed income distribution
information contained in EUROMOD as well as information on changing labor market
patterns over time contained in the LFS. We are thus able to account for heterogeneity
in various characteristics of the populations in di¤erent countries which macro data
approaches cannot capture.
In our simulation experiment, we introduce an unemployment insurance scheme for
the EA18 member states and ask what would have happened if such a scheme had
been introduced from the start of the euro in 1999. As there are neither panel data
nor repeated cross-sectional data available containing both income distributions and
labor market conditions for all EA member states over this period, we construct a
series of reweighted cross-sections for the period of analysis which exactly replicates
changes in labor market conditions (unemployment rate, share of short- and long-term
unemployed, size and composition of the labor force) and average earnings over time.10
Our baseline input data is from EU-SILC 2008, the most recent data available with
the version of EUROMOD used, including the EA18 member states. For each country,
these data are rst reweighted to reect labor market conditions as observed in 1999
and then reweighted subsequently for each year of the analysis.
From the LFS, we impute changes in (un)employment rates, size of the labor force,
shares of short- and long-term unemployment, and coverage rates of national UI systems
for 18 gender-age-education strata (male/female, three age groups, three education lev-
els) on an annual basis. We simulate (un)employment changes over time for each of
the 18 socio-demographic subgroups so that our series of reweighted cross-sections pre-
cisely matches these dimensions both at the subgroup and aggregate level. Earnings
growth is imputed from the AMECO-database in order to account for changes in the
tax base of the EMU-UI and national UI systems. These imputations ensure that our
reweighted micro data are consistent with aggregate statistics in each year of our sim-
ulation period (see Technical Appendix A.2 for further information). The analysis at
the subgroup level allows us to examine individual heterogeneity within each member
9Sutherland and Figari (2013) provide more detailed information on EUROMOD, the under-
lying input data and validation. The EU-LFS, conducted by the national statistical institutes
across Europe and processed by Eurostat, is a representative household survey covering the years
from 1983 onwards. It is the most important source for labor market statistics in the EU.
Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-force-survey for further in-
formation.
10See Immvervoll et al. (2006), Bargain et al. (2012) and Dolls et al. (2012) for further applications
of the reweighting approach. Similar imputations from the LFS to EUROMOD input data have been
conducted by Navicke et al. (2014) and Salgado et al. (2014).
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state (section 4.4). In addition, we construct a national UI calculator that incorporates
all important policy rules of national UI systems over the period 200013 and simu-
late national unemployment benets in addition to EMU-UI benets in case of dual
insurance and in the benchmark scenario.11
Our analysis is based on the following simplifying assumptions. First, we do not
take into account general equilibrium e¤ects of an EMU-UI system, i.e., our analysis
remains in a partial equilibrium context. This implies that we abstract both from
potential moral hazard of national governments and administrations which could have
adverse labor market e¤ects as well as from potential growth-enhancing e¤ects of an
EMU-UI scheme. Accounting for these macroeconomic feedback e¤ects would require
to link our micro data to a macro-econometric simulation model (Peichl 2009). Second,
we do not simulate changes in government behavior or individual behavioral responses,
e.g. potential migration responses, changes in hours worked or di¤erent patterns of
entries and exits to the labor force which could follow the introduction of an EMU-
UI.12 In the light of these assumptions, our results should be interpreted as rst-round
e¤ects of an EMU-UI system. A further assumption relates to the interaction between
EMU-UI and national UI systems given that a basic EMU-UI system analyzed in
this paper would partly replace national UI systems. As elaborated in more detail
in section 4.1, we assume that national UI systems top up the EMU-UI scheme if
national UI systems have a more generous replacement rate, and are fully cut back
otherwise. In e¤ect, our simulations imply that no unemployed would be worse o¤
after the introduction of an EMU-UI system. Finally, we run our simulations as if the
EA18 had existed from 1999 onwards as it would complicate the interpretation of our
results if we included new member states only after adoption of the euro.
4 Main results
4.1 Automatic scal stabilization
Automatic scal stabilization is associated with the ability of taxes and transfers to
automatically stabilize disposable income and consequently consumption in the event
of macroeconomic shocks. This relies on a simple mechanism: in the presence of a
11Detailed policy rules of national UI systems are collected from country chap-
ters of the OECD series "Benets and Wages" (http://www.oecd.org/social/benets-
and-wages.htm) and from the EUs MISSOC-Comparative Tables Database
(http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=815). Actual coverage rates are imputed
from the EU-LFS.
12See Craig et al. (2016) for an analysis of state government behavior with regard to bu¤er-stock
savings in the UI program in the US. Bargain et al. (2013) account for labor supply behavior af-
ter the introduction of a European tax and transfer system and nd small labor supply responses.
Whether distortions at the individual level change would depend on the change in overall benets and
contributions in case of dual insurance relative to the status quo.
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negative shock to gross income, taxes decline and transfers increase, with the decline
in disposable income being smaller than the shock to gross income (Auerbach and
Feenberg 2000, Kniesner and Ziliak 2002, Dolls et al. 2012). Several components of
government budgets are a¤ected by the macroeconomic situation in ways that operate
to smooth the business cycle, with progressive income taxes and unemployment benets
being the most prominent examples.13
There are three potential stabilization channels of an EMU-UI system. First, it
could be designed to be more countercyclical than national UI systems, for example
through higher replacement rates, longer benet durations, less stringent eligibility con-
ditions or cyclical variability of its rules. The rst channel would stabilize household
incomes of the unemployed in those countries whose national UI systems are less coun-
tercyclical than the EMU-UI system. At the same time, it would impose a nancial
burden on employers and employees who would need to nance more generous benets.
Second, the introduction of a common EMU-UI system e¤ectively means that national
UI systems are rst harmonized such that they fulll minimum requirements as dened
by the conditions of the EMU-UI system and subsequently centralized. Centralization
could give rise to interregional smoothing gains due to the (geographically) widened
budget of the UI scheme. Third, an EMU-UI scheme that is allowed to issue debt
might provide intertemporal smoothing gains in the presence of nancing constraints
at the national level. While the rst and third stabilization channel do not require
the introduction of a common EMU-UI system as improved counter-cyclicality or in-
tertemporal smoothing can in the absence of nancing or institutional constraints 
be achieved by national UI systems, the second channel points to the potential added
value of a centralized EMU-UI system.
Decomposition. We provide a formal decomposition framework in order to disen-
tangle the three stabilization channels by sequentially introducing di¤erent integration
steps of the EMU-UI system (Table 1). As a benchmark, we simulate national UI
systems representing actual national legislation and assume that they need to be bal-
anced in every year, i.e., the contribution rate is set such that total contributions equal
unemployment benets paid in a given year. We employ a national UI calculator as
described in section 3 that accounts for all relevant rules of national UI schemes. As a
rst reform scenario, we simulate harmonized national UI systems that fulll the min-
imum conditions of the baseline EMU-UI scheme. If national rules are more generous
than the minimum requirements imposed by harmonization, for example by having
a replacement rate above 50 per cent, we assume that national rules are maintained
so that no short-term unemployed is worse o¤ after harmonization. The harmonized
13Automatic stabilization might not only have e¤ects on disposable income and consumption but
also on GDP itself (cf. Fatás and Mihov 2001). If fewer taxes are collected and more transfers are
paid in a recession, this should support private incomes and dampen adverse movements in aggregate
demand.
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Table 1: Simulated UI schemes
1. National UI (no debt issuance): BNATi , SIC
NAT
i
2. Harmonized national UI (no debt issuance): B
NAT,harm.
i , SIC
NAT,harm.
i
3. EMU-UI (no debt issuance): B
EMU,no-debt
i , SIC
EMU,no-debt
i
4. EMU-UI (debt issuance): B
EMU,debt
i , SIC
EMU,debt
i
Note: Bi stands for unemployment benets paid to short-term unemployed i, SICi for social insurance contributions
paid by employee or employer i. Our assumption that the initial benet level (step 1) is maintained by national UI
schemes topping-up benets in schemes 2-4  if they are less generous than in step 1 implies that in any given
country and year, it holds that
BNATi BNAT,harm.i =BEMU,no-debti =BEMU,debti and
SICNATi 6=SICNAT,harm.i 6=SICEMU,no-debti 6=SICEMU,debti :
national UI schemes cannot issue debt either and national contributions are set so that
they nance national benets in every year. The next step is to introduce a common
EMU-UI system by pooling the harmonized national UI schemes. The EMU-UI scheme
has a common budget covering EA-18 member states, with a uniform contribution rate
(interregional smoothing). We continue to assume that the scheme cannot issue debt
at this stage. No short-term unemployed is made worse o¤ by moving from the har-
monized to the centralized UI scheme as its replacement rate is topped up by national
UI schemes if national replacement rates are higher than the replacement rate of the
EMU-UI scheme.14 In a nal step, the centralized EMU-UI scheme is allowed to issue
debt and the contribution rate is set so that the budget is balanced over the period
200013 (intertemporal smoothing).
For each of the four UI schemes, we estimate automatic stabilization e¤ects by
calculating a stabilization coe¢ cient  (Auerbach and Feenberg 2000, Dolls et al.
2012) that shows to what extent (un)employment shocks are absorbed by changes
in unemployment benets and social insurance contributions.  is computed using
arithmetic changes () in benet and contribution payments as well as changes in
employment income in a given year t (
P
iBi;
P
iSICi and
P
iY
EMPL
i ) which
are aggregated across individuals i in each member state (subscript t suppressed for
simplicity). Note that changes in employment income are calculated for employment
changes along the extensive margin only in order to isolate the stabilizing e¤ect in
the event of (un)employment shocks from (intensive margin) income changes. The
stabilization coe¢ cient reads:
14If, for example, the replacement rate of national UI is 60 per cent of gross income and the
replacement rate of EMU-UI 50 per cent, we assume that the replacement rate of EMU-UI is topped
up by 10 percentage points by the national government such that the overall replacement rate is still
60 per cent.
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 =
P
iSICi  
P
iBiP
iY
EMPL
i
= SIC + B: (1)
The stabilization gain of moving from actual national UI schemes (scheme 1) to
harmonized national UI schemes (scheme 2) follows from harmonization. Di¤erences
in stabilization e¤ects between harmonized national UI schemes and the centralized
EMU-UI scheme (scheme 3) are due to interregional smoothing, while intertemporal
smoothing e¤ects are singled out by comparing EMU-UI schemes without and with debt
issuance (scheme 4). Formally, the total stabilization gain of moving from national UI
schemes that cannot issue debt (step 1) to an EMU-UI scheme with debt issuance (step
4) is decomposed as follows:
 tot = EMU UI;debt   NAT UI;no debt
= NAT UI;harm:   NAT UI| {z }
Harmonization
+EMU UI;no debt   NAT UI;harm:| {z }
 Interreg ional Smooth ing
+EMU UI;debt   EMU UI;no debt| {z }
 Intertemporal Smooth ing
(2)
Using the fact that unemployment benet payments do not di¤er between UI
schemes 2 to 4
P
iB
NAT
i 
P
iB
NAT;harm:
i =
P
iB
EMU;no debt
i =
P
iB
EMU;debt
i

,
while social insurance contributions vary across all four UI schemesP
iSIC
NAT
i 6=
P
iSIC
NAT;harm:
i 6=
P
iSIC
EMU;no debt
i 6=
P
iSIC
EMU;debt
i

, the
decomposition can be written as:
 tot = EMU UI;debt   NAT UI;no debt
=
P
iSIC
NAT;harm:
i  
P
iB
NAT;harm:
i

   PiSICNATi  PiBNATi P
iY
EMPL
i| {z }
Harmonization
+
P
iSIC
EMU;no debt
i  
P
iSIC
NAT;harm:
i

P
iY
EMPL
i| {z }
 Interreg ional Smooth ing
+
P
iSIC
EMU;debt
i  
P
iSIC
EMU;no debt
i

P
iY
EMPL
i| {z }
 Intertemporal Smooth ing
(3)
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Harmonization gains. We have assumed for the decomposition analysis that
both national as well as harmonized national UI schemes cannot issue debt and hence
need to balance their budget every year. This means that any increase (decrease)
in unemployment benet payments in a given year goes along with a corresponding
increase (decrease) in social insurance contributions. The net e¤ect of harmonization
thus depends on how short-term unemployed as well as employers and employees who
would have to bear the burden of rising contributions (due to the move from scheme 1
to scheme 2) di¤er in their propensity to consume, and on behavioural responses to the
policy change.15 The combined stabilization e¤ect of harmonized benets and adjusted
contributions to nance the changed benets is neutral in our analysis. This is because
the changes in both benets and contributions are received and paid by employees
and rms in the same country and we disregard subtleties like di¤erent propensities to
spend out of current income. As shown in Figure 8 (Appendix), unemployment benets
have a countercyclical e¤ect, i.e. they increase (decrease) when the number of short-
term unemployed goes up (down), whereas social insurance contributions are always
procyclical in schemes 1 and 2 (B  0; SIC  0). There is substantial heterogeneity
between national UI schemes with regard to the degree of income insurance in case
of unemployment. The cushioning e¤ect of unemployment benets ranges between an
average of 1 per cent (Italy, Malta) and 14 per cent (Luxembourg), while harmonized
unemployment benets absorb on average 1327 per cent of the changes in employment
income.16 Consequently, the stabilization gain through harmonizing unemployment
benets di¤ers across member states and over time ranging from an average of 7 per
cent (Germany) to 20 per cent (Cyprus).
Smoothing gains. As shown in formula (3), the EMU-UI scheme has a coun-
tercyclical (and hence stabilizing) e¤ect through interregional smoothing if  in the
presence of rising unemployment
 P
iY
EMPL
i < 0

 the increase in contribution
payments to the centralized EMU-UI scheme is smaller than to the harmonized na-
tional UI scheme
P
iSIC
EMU;no debt
i <
P
iSIC
NAT;harm:
i

, and vice versa. Recall
that debt issuance is ruled out to single out the e¤ect of interregional smoothing. Debt
will be used in the next step, to quantify intertemporal smoothing gains. These gains
materialize if
P
iSIC
EMU;debt
i <
P
iSIC
EMU;no debt
i in case of a negative shock to
employment income
 P
iY
EMPL
i < 0

, and vice versa.
Figure 9 (Appendix) illustrates smoothing gains. Here, we focus on comparing the
cases of Germany and Spain. In 2009, the year with the most signicant surge in
unemployment in the euro area, Spains income loss by far exceeded the average shock.
The German labor market, in contrast, proved to be robust. The decline in income
15Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014), among others, show that the marginal proposensity to consume
di¤ers substantially across the income distribution.
16Note that these estimates only capture income insurance for the short-term unemployed, i.e.,
they depend on both the design of the UI schemes and on the incidence of short-term unemployment.
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due to unemployment was relatively small. Figure 9 shows that contributions to the
harmonized UI scheme in Spain would have risen more than those to the pooled EMU-
UI scheme (without debt). Therefore, a common EMU-UI budget would have had a
stabilizing e¤ect on Spain. Our results suggest that 20 per cent of Spains income loss
in 2009 would have been absorbed through interregional smoothing, a scal stimulus
amounting to roughly 0.6 per cent of GDP (calculated as the di¤erence between Delta
SIC Harm. NAT-UIand Delta SIC EMU-UI no debtwhich are shown on the right-
hand side y-axis). The opposite e¤ect can be observed for Germany where a move from
the harmonized to the centralized UI scheme would have had a destabilizing e¤ect in
2009 amounting to almost 80 per cent of the income shock in that year, or 0.2 per cent
of GDP. This procyclical e¤ect could have been avoided only by letting the EMU-UI
scheme issue debt as can be seen by the positive intertemporal smoothing e¤ect.
Germany, in turn, experienced deteriorating labor market conditions in the early
2000s with largest income losses in 2003 and 2004. In these years, roughly 10 per cent
of the losses would have been absorbed through interregional smoothing, corresponding
to 0.06 per cent of GDP. If the EMU-UI scheme had been allowed to issue debt, UI
contributions would have remained constant in spite of rising unemployment. This
would have led to intertemporal smoothing gains in a similar order of magnitude as
those through smoothing across countries.
How large is the overall smoothing e¤ect? We use the following summary measures
for stabilization e¤ects achieved over the period 200013:17
 Int-reg. =
X
t
0@ PiY EMPLit P
t j
P
iY
EMPL
it j
P
iSIC
EMU;no debt
it  
P
iSIC
NAT;harm:
it

P
iY
EMPL
it
1A
 Int-tem. =
X
t
0@ PiY EMPLit P
t j
P
iY
EMPL
it j
P
iSIC
EMU;debt
it  
P
iSIC
EMU;no debt
it

P
iY
EMPL
it
1A(4)
Table 2 shows that the weighted average interregional smoothing e¤ect is in a
range between -5 per cent (Malta) and 22 per cent (Latvia). Our results suggest
that the extent of synchronization of changes in short-term unemployment has been
su¢ ciently low over the period 200013 to allow for interregional smoothing gains,
but that these gains are unevenly distributed across countries. Overall, all member
states except Malta would have been stabilized through the geographical widening of
the budget, even though we nd procyclical e¤ects for most countries in some years.
Ceteris paribus a move from harmonized UI schemes whose contributions are always
17Note that the stabilization e¤ects are weighted with the relative size of the shocks. This is because
without weighting stabilization coe¢ cients can be very large in years with small shocks. This is due
to the fact that  goes to innity when
P
iY
EMPL
it converges to zero.
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Table 2: Smoothing e¤ects of baseline EMU-UI
Interregional Intertemporal Overall
AT 5.8 18.2 24.0
BE 3.0 14.5 17.5
CY 17.7 7.3 25.0
EE 19.4 0.8 20.2
FI 2.4 22.5 25.0
FR 7.7 12.8 20.5
GE 11.0 5.8 16.8
GR 12.0 4.8 16.9
IE 15.7 5.9 21.6
IT 5.5 11.4 16.9
LU 7.1 18.0 25.1
LV 21.6 1.2 22.8
MT -4.6 24.9 20.3
NL 8.3 13.9 22.2
PT 13.4 5.8 19.2
SI 5.6 13.5 19.1
SK 9.6 5.6 15.2
SP 17.8 5.3 23.0
EA18 9.9 9.3 19.2
Notes: Stabilization coe¢ cients for interregional and intertemporal smoothing weighted by shock size over the period
2000-13. Smoothing coe¢ cients at EA-18 level calculated as population-weighted average of member states smoothing
coe¢ cients. The unweighted smoothing coe¢ cients at EA-18 level are 10.0 for interregional smoothing and 10.7 for
intertemporal smoothing. Country abbreviations: AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, CY: Cyprus, EE: Estonia, FI: Finland,
FR: France, GE: Germany, GR: Greece, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, LU: Luxembourg, LV: Latvia, MT: Malta, NL:
Netherlands, PT: Portugal, SI: Slovenia, SK: Slovakia, SP: Spain, EA18: 18 member states that had introduced the
euro in 2014. Lithuania that has adopted the euro in 2015 is not included due to data availability. Sources: AMECO,
EU-LFS and own calculations based on EUROMOD.
procyclical to a centralized EMU-UI scheme would have made scal policy in the euro
area as a whole more countercyclical. The average interregional smoothing e¤ect at
EA-level amounts to 10 per cent. Letting the EMU-UI scheme issue debt would have
made contributions less volatile and thus would have contributed to macroeconomic
stabilization. The average cushioning e¤ect through intertemporal smoothing ranges
between 1 per cent (Estonia) to 25 per cent (Malta). At EA-level, it amounts to 9 per
cent being of similar magnitude as the interregional smoothing e¤ect.
4.2 Coverage rates
Figure 1 provides descriptive statistics on unemployment and (counterfactual) coverage
rates of EMU-UI and national UI over the period 200013. It shows that the share
of unemployed covered by EMU-UI measured relative to the total labor force (green
line) follows closely trends in overall unemployment. However, coverage rates of EMU-
14
UI measured as the share of unemployed receiving EMU-UI benets relative to all
unemployed (orange line) diverge from unemployment rates in times of rising or falling
unemployment as can be seen, for instance, for Germany in the early 2000s or for
Greece, Ireland and Spain during the recent crisis period. The reason is that the share
of non-eligible long-term unemployed usually goes up (down) in prolonged recessions
(upswings).
Figure 1 shows further that coverage rates of EMU-UI di¤er substantially across
EA countries ranging from an average of 34 per cent in Slovakia to 79 per cent in
Finland which is due to di¤erences in the share of short-term unemployment. Finally,
it points to a signicant coverage gap between our simulated EMU-UI scheme and
national UI revealed by a comparison of the orange and red lines. Coverage of national
UI is particularly low in some Southern and Eastern European member states such as
Greece, Italy, Latvia, Malta or Slovakia, all with average coverage rates of the short-
term unemployed over the period 200013 below 15 per cent.
Figure 1: Unemployment and coverage rates of EMU-UI and national UI
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Note: Unemployment rate and share EMU-UI recipients measured in per cent of the labor force. Coverage EMU-UI
and national UI calculated as number of short-term unemployed receiving UI benets relative to total number of
unemployed. Coverage national UI includes UI benets and assistance. If coverage information is missing in the LFS
for a given country in one year, it is imputed from the closest country-year cell available. Sources: LFS and own
calculations based on EUROMOD.
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4.3 Budgetary e¤ects and nancial ows
For the analysis of budgetary e¤ects and nancial ows across across member states, we
consider an EMU-UI scheme that is allowed to issue debt (scheme 4 in Table 1). Based
on simulated EMU-UI benets and the overall tax base, we calculate the contribution
rate that would have led to revenue-neutrality at the EA-level over the period 200013.
It amounts to 1.56 per cent on employment income.18 Next, we simulate contribution
payments to EMU-UI under the assumption that the scheme can run decits and
surpluses in single years. Figure 2 shows the evolution of contributions and benets at
EA18-level. While contributions would have almost constantly grown over the period
due to growth in nominal earnings, benet payments would have uctuated to a much
larger extent. On average, benets and contributions amount to roughly 47 billion euro
per year. The scheme would have run surpluses from 200003 and from 200508 and
decits in the remaining years, in particular during the recent nancial and economic
crisis.19
Figure 3 shows average yearly net contributions as well as minimum and maxi-
mum payments for the baseline scenario. Relative to GDP, Austria, Germany and the
Netherlands would have been the largest net contributors with average net contribu-
tions of 0.19 per cent in Germany, 0.24 per cent in Austria and 0.39 per cent in the
Netherlands. Latvia (-0.36 per cent) and Spain (-0.54 per cent) would have been the
largest net recipients. Interestingly, the majority of member states would have been
net contributors in some years and net recipients in other years. Notable exceptions
are Austria, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (Spain). These countries would have
been in a permanent net contributor (recipient) position.
Finally, we compare the baseline EMU-UI scheme with debt issuance (variant A)
to variants with lower coverage and generosity levels (variants BE). We introduce a
waiting period of 2 months after job loss before eligibility to EMU-UI benets begins in
order to diminish the e¤ect of seasonal unemployment and limit the maximum benet
to 50 per cent of median income (variant B). Variant C has a replacement rate of 35
per cent of gross income which is on average equivalent to a replacement rate of 50 per
cent of net income. Benets are capped at 50 per cent of median income, but there is
no waiting period. Variant D combines variants B and C (maximum benet amount of
50 per cent of median income, 35 per cent replacement rate, waiting period). Variant
18Social insurance contributions include employer and employee contributions. If self-employed
were excluded from the scheme, the revenue-neutral contribution rate would be 1.7 per cent. Note
that policy-makers would need to set the contribution rate ex-ante based on expected nancial ows.
This implies that in practice contributions might deviate from benets ex-post. One option to minimize
resulting decits would be to regularly adjust the contribution rate or, alternatively, to require member
states to make extra-payments to balance the budget. Surpluses could be used to build up reserves
that would be available in bad times.
19In real terms at constant 2005 prices, contributions (benets) would have risen from 41 (37)
billion euro in 2000 to 47 (57) billion euro in 2013.
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Figure 2: Overall contributions and benets at Eurozone-level, 2000-13
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Note: Social insurance contributions (SIC) and benets (BEN) at Eurozone-level in nominal terms. Contribution rate
uniform across member states. Scheme is revenue-neutral over the simulation period. Sources: AMECO, EU-LFS and
own calculations based on EUROMOD.
E is based on variant D, but only those short-term unemployed that receive national
UI benets are eligible to EMU-UI benets. Results are presented in Figure 4 and
Table 3. Figure 4 shows average yearly net contributions under variants A (blue bars),
B (green bars) and D (red bars).20 Average net contributions under variants B-E are
usually smaller than in the baseline. France becomes a permanent net recipient under
variants B-D, albeit with average net contributions below -0.1 per cent of GDP. In
Estonia and Portugal, the average net position changes from recipient to contributor
which is due to low median incomes in these member states.
Table 3 compares contribution rates for di¤erent variants of EMU-UI topped up
by national UI (columns A-E) with contribution rates in the benchmark scenario of
national UI alone (column NAT-UI). Columns A-E display the sum of the uniform
EMU-UI and the country-specic national UI contribution rates required for topping
up EMU-UI if applicable. Both contribution rates are calculated such that revenue-
neutrality over the whole simulation period is ensured. Column NAT-UI shows revenue-
20Country-year specic net contributions for all variants are available from the authors upon re-
quest.
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Figure 3: Average yearly net contributions, 2000-13
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Note: Net contributions (SIC - BEN) for baseline scheme. Contribution rate uniform across member states. Scheme is
revenue-neutral over the simulation period. Sources: AMECO, EU-LFS and own calculations based on EUROMOD.
neutral contribution rates for national UI alone which are calculated under the assump-
tion that national UI benets were only paid to the short-term unemployed to make
sure that contribution rates are indeed comparable. Table 3 reveals that contribution
rates in case of dual insurance are usually higher than those in the benchmark case of
national UI alone. This is mainly due to coverage gaps between EMU-UI and national
UI (section 4.2). Only under variant E (EMU-UI with actual coverage rate of national
UI systems), contribution rates under dual insurance would be lower in a few coun-
tries. Interestingly, both countries which are on average net contributors (Belgium,
Germany) as well as net recipients (France, Ireland, Spain) belong to this group. The
reason is that in a scenario of EMU-UI where national eligibility rules are applied, not
only the evolution of the short-term unemployment rate in a given country vis-à-vis the
rest of the EA would determine whether contribution rates under dual insurance are
higher or lower than in the benchmark, but also the extent to which the unemployed
are covered by national UI systems.
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Table 3: Contribution rates in case of dual insurance vs. benchmark
A B C D E NAT-UI
AT 1.57 1.12 1.05 0.89 0.52 0.38
BE 1.68 1.32 1.28 1.18 0.81 0.90
CY 1.60 1.15 1.09 0.91 0.54 0.37
EE 1.57 1.17 1.10 0.95 0.58 0.51
FI 1.67 1.23 1.09 0.96 0.59 0.55
FR 1.74 1.49 1.46 1.35 0.98 1.04
GE 1.57 1.18 1.10 0.99 0.62 0.68
GR 1.60 1.14 1.01 0.86 0.49 0.42
IE 1.65 1.27 1.12 1.04 0.67 0.80
IT 1.56 1.04 0.98 0.76 0.39 0.10
LU 1.78 1.39 1.34 1.16 0.79 0.63
LV 1.56 1.21 1.14 0.98 0.61 0.50
MT 1.56 1.02 0.95 0.72 0.35 0.07
NL 1.69 1.25 1.20 0.99 0.62 0.40
PT 1.75 1.49 1.46 1.30 0.93 0.87
SI 1.69 1.28 1.25 1.07 0.70 0.58
SK 1.56 1.13 1.09 0.90 0.53 0.38
SP 1.98 1.83 1.81 1.76 1.39 1.61
Notes: Country-specic contribution rates (in % of employment income) in case of dual insurance (columns A-E) and
in the benchmark (column NAT-UI). A: Baseline, all new unemployed with previous employment income covered. B:
Max. EMU-UI benet 50% of median income and waiting period of 2 months. C: Max. EMU-UI benet 50% of
median income and EMU-UI replacement rate of 35%. D: Max. EMU-UI benet 50% of median income, EMU-UI
repl. rate of 35%, waiting period of 2 months. E: D + EMU-UI with actual coverage of national UI. NAT-UI: national
UI alone. Sources: EU-LFS and own calculations based on EUROMOD.
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Figure 4: Average yearly net contributions - Other EMU-UI variants
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4.4 Within-country heterogeneity
A further contribution of this paper is to explore the e¤ects of an EMU-UI scheme at
the micro level. While the previous sections were focusing on aggregate e¤ects across
countries, this section asks what impact dual insurance of EMU-UI and national UI
systems would have on di¤erent individuals within each country. To answer this ques-
tion, we split the labor force into 18 subgroups according to three socio-demographic
characteristics, namely gender, age and education (cf. section 3). The groups solely
comprise individuals who are part of the labor force, i.e. who are either employed or
unemployed.
Figure 5 presents coverage and stabilization gains which are calculated as the dif-
ference in average coverage rates and stabilization coe¢ cients B under dual insurance
(variant A) and the benchmark (national UI alone). Stabilization gains for the un-
employed correspond to those presented in Figure 8 for the harmonization scenario,
but are now disaggregated for 18 population subgroups. In several member states,
largest coverage and stabilization gains are found for young unemployed who often do
not meet eligibility conditions of national UI due to insu¢ cient contribution periods.
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Interestingly, high-skilled unemployed tend to face larger coverage and stabilization
gains than the low- or medium-skilled. This can be explained by a higher proportion
of short-term relative to long-term unemployed among the high-skilled. In other words,
long-term unemployment which is not covered by EMU-UI is more prevalent among
the low- and medium-skilled. Our results suggest that less stringent eligibility condi-
tions could improve income insurance especially for the young, while more generous
UI for the short-term unemployed might not be an e¤ective policy to provide income
protection for the low-skilled unemployed. However, as discussed above such policy
changes could be achieved through harmonization of national UI systems and do not
require the introduction of a centralized EMU-UI system.
Figure 5: Coverage and stabilization gains across socio-demographic groups
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5 Alternative scenarios
5.1 Experience rating
Until now, we have analyzed an EMU-UI system with a uniform contribution rate across
member states that is revenue-neutral at the EA-level. The analysis in the previous
section has shown that under EMU-UI variant A, four member states would have been
either a permanent net contributor (Austria, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) or net
recipient (Spain). Therefore, an interesting analytical exercise is to calculate country-
specic contribution rates that balance the EMU-UI budget in each member state
which is equivalent to harmonizing national UI schemes such that their eligibility rules
and replacement rates correspond to the EMU-UI system (c.f. section 4.1).
Table 4 presents country-specic contribution rates for the di¤erent variants of
EMU-UI that would have led to revenue-neutrality over the period 200013. The last
row of Table 4 shows uniform contribution rates that balance the budget at the EA,
but not the member-state level. Given the di¤erences in net contributions across mem-
ber states presented in the previous section, it is not surprising that country-specic
contribution rates di¤er signicantly ranging from 0.75 per cent in the Netherlands to
3.29 per cent in Spain under variant A. Less generous schemes (columns B-E) require
lower contribution rates for revenue-neutrality.
Figure 6 presents average country-specic contribution rates for EMU-UI that bal-
ance national budgets in each year as well as maximum and minimum contribution
rates over the period. In Austria, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the three member
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Table 4: Contribution rates for EMU-UI variants
A B C D E
AT 0.97 0.57 0.54 0.40 0.24
BE 1.44 0.99 0.93 0.69 0.43
CY 1.91 1.14 1.07 0.80 0.22
EE 1.74 0.96 0.90 0.67 0.26
FI 1.46 0.95 0.92 0.66 0.37
FR 1.88 1.21 1.15 0.85 0.39
GE 1.14 0.76 0.71 0.53 0.40
GR 2.31 1.38 1.28 0.96 0.29
IE 1.86 1.09 1.02 0.77 0.48
IT 1.53 1.01 0.95 0.71 0.06
LU 1.05 0.61 0.58 0.43 0.17
LV 3.18 1.74 1.62 1.22 0.33
MT 1.46 0.92 0.87 0.64 0.14
NL 0.75 0.42 0.39 0.29 0.11
PT 1.82 0.98 0.91 0.69 0.27
SI 1.29 0.84 0.78 0.59 0.21
SK 2.25 1.51 1.37 1.06 0.25
SP 3.29 2.08 1.96 1.45 0.55
EA18 1.56 1.00 0.94 0.70 0.33
Notes: Country-specic contribution rates (in % of employment income) that balance the EMU-UI budget in each
member state over the period 2000-13. Last row: uniform contribution rates that balance the overall EMU-UI budget
at Eurozone-level (but not in each single member state). A: Baseline, all new unemployed with previous employment
income covered. B: Max. EMU-UI benet 50% of median income and waiting period of 2 months. C: Max. EMU-UI
benet 50% of median income and EMU-UI replacement rate of 35%. D: Max. EMU-UI benet 50% of median
income, EMU-UI repl. rate of 35%, waiting period of 2 months. E: D + EMU-UI with actual coverage of national UI.
Sources: AMECO, EU-LFS and own calculations based on EUROMOD.
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states that would have been permanent net contributors, revenue-neutral contribution
rates are always below the uniform (Eurozone-wide) contribution rate of 1.56 per cent
(dashed horizontal line), while the opposite is true for Spain, the only permanent net
recipient throughout the simulation period in the baseline scenario (variant A).
Figure 6: Country-specic contribution rates: Annual balanced budget
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Note: Dashed horizontal line: Revenue-neutral uniform contribution rate (1.56 per cent) at EA-level for the period
2000-13. Blue bars: Average country-specic contribution rates that balance the budget in each single year. Black
vertical lines: Maximum/Minimum country-specic contribution rates that balance the budget in each single year.
Sources: AMECO, EU-LFS and own calculations based on EUROMOD.
5.2 Contingent transfers
As a further variant, we simulate an EMU-UI scheme with contingent benets which are
activated once certain triggers are reached and analyze its budgetary and redistributive
e¤ects, in particular whether such a scheme reduces cross-country transfers. Our choice
of the trigger is guided by the US Extended Benet (EB) program which permits
states to use either the insured or the total unemployment rate to qualify for extended
unemployment benets (Nicholson et al. 2014). We choose the total unemployment
rate as a trigger so that activation of contingent transfers is independent from eligibility
conditions of national unemployment insurance systems. Precisely, benets from the
EMU-UI system are triggered if the unemployment rate in year t is at least 1 percentage
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point higher than the unemployment rate in i) year t 1, ii) years t 1 or t 2, iii) years
t 1 or t 2 or t 3. Longer look-back periods ensure that EMU-UI benets can remain
activated in sustained periods of high unemployment.21 In all other dimensions (payout
rules, uniform contribution rate across member states), the contingent benet schemes
i-iii are identical to the baseline scheme (variant A) which implies that by construction
member states are net contributors in those years when contingent benets are not
triggered.
Table 5 in the Appendix shows that while with a three-year look-back period, con-
tingent benets would have been triggered in all member states at least once, they
would not have been activated in Malta (Belgium and Malta) in any year with a two-
year (one-year) look-back period. The divergence in unemployment across countries
since the start of the euro in 1999 becomes evident by a comparison of activation pe-
riods. While the short-term unemployed in Germany or Luxembourg, for instance,
would have received EMU-UI benets only in the period 2003-05 (and in 2013 in Lux-
embourg under variant iii), transfers would have been activated in Greece, Ireland, Italy
and Spain only from 2008/09 onwards (with the exception of Greece under variant iii in
2000). Not surprisingly, with average yearly benet and contribution payments of 13,
19 and 22 billion euro at the Eurozone-level, the overall budget of the contingent bene-
t schemes i-iii is signicantly lower than in our baseline scenario with non-contingent
benets (47 billion per year). Consequently, revenue-neutral contribution rates are less
than half as large as in the baseline (0.42, 0.64 and 0.72 rather than 1.56 per cent).
Figure 7 compares cumulative net contributions under the contingent benet schemes
to the baseline (variant A). A key nding is that a few member states change their
net contributing position in terms of accumulated net contributions at the end of the
simulation period (France, Slovenia). Austria, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the
three member states that would have been net contributors in each year in the baseline,
are now net receivers in some years. In the Netherlands, accumulated net contributions
are reduced by more than 50 per cent by the end of the simulation period relative to
the baseline. Spain, a net recipient in the baseline throughout the simulation period, is
a net contributor until 2007 and a net recipient in the remaining years. These results
show that an EMU-UI system with contingent benets could indeed provide more tar-
geted transfers to member states which see their labor market conditions signicantly
deteriorating.
What are the automatic stabilization e¤ects of such a scheme? Given that the
contingent benet schemes considered here correspond to the non-contingent baseline
scheme in all dimensions besides the activation of the scheme, UI benets paid to the
short-term unemployed are the same once EMU-UI benets are triggered. However,
21In the US the Tax Relief Act changed the look-back period in the EB program from a two-year to
a three-year period in the recent recession to increase its stabilization impact (Nicholson and Needels
2011).
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it must be taken into account that countries that have not reached the trigger (but
might well be in a recession) could be worse o¤ compared to a situation with a non-
contingent EMU-UI system as they wouldnt benet from interregional smoothing. The
link between contribution and benet payments would be broken and households in
these member states would need to nance both their national unemployment insurance
system as well as the EMU-UI system. This potential destabilizing e¤ect could be
prevented by suspending contribution payments to the EMU-UI system under certain
circumstances such as rising unemployment rates.
Figure 7: Cumulative net contributions - Contingent benets
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6 Conclusion
The economic crisis in the Eurozone has revived the debate about deeper scal integra-
tion and has brought this topic to the top of the European policy agenda. A common
unemployment insurance system is one widely discussed reform proposal. Such a sys-
tem could serve as a scal risk sharing mechanism in the EA. Supporters of this idea
argue that a centralized EMU-UI system would cushion asymmetric shocks in the Eu-
rozone and provide income insurance to those households which are most vulnerable. It
would thus not only improve the economic resilience of EMU and make its institutional
architecture more sustainable, but also strengthen the social dimension of European
policy-making. However, main concerns include the risk of permanent transfer ows
across member states and moral hazard for national economic policies, administra-
tions and individuals. These moral hazard e¤ects would lead to more, rather than less
unemployment.
The aim of this paper has been to provide insights on the potential added value of
an EMU-UI. This added value depends on its ability to provide interregional smooth-
ing. We have developed a decomposition framework that disentangles interregional
smoothing e¤ects from other stabilization channels such as improved counter-cyclicality
of national UI schemes and intertemporal smoothing through debt. In our empirical
analysis, we have used counterfactual simulation techniques based on harmonized Eu-
ropean micro data to quantify the importance of each stabilization channel and to
assess redistributive e¤ects. We have also discussed how di¤erent design options would
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a¤ect moral hazard issues.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. A basic scheme, partly replacing
national unemployment insurance systems, with a replacement rate of 50 per cent, a
maximum benet duration of 12 months and a broad coverage of all new unemployed
with previous employment income would have provided interregional smoothing gains
by cushioning on average 10 per cent of the income uctuations due to transitions
into and out of unemployment at EA-level. For individual member states, average
interregional smoothing e¤ects range from -5 per cent (Malta) to 22 per cent (Latvia).
Overall, 17 out of 18 member states would have beneted from interregional smoothing.
However, for most countries, we also nd procyclical e¤ects in some years. Our results
suggest that the interregional smoothing potential is as important as intertemporal
smoothing through debt. The latter provides an additional cushioning e¤ect of 9 per
cent at EA-level. On average, the annual budget would have amounted to 47 billion
euro per year at the Eurozone-level, nanced by a contribution rate of 1.56 per cent
on employment income. We nd that 4 out of 18 member states would have been
either net contributors or net recipients in each year of our simulation period. This
happens although the scheme is not designed to generate permanent redistribution
across countries.
In terms of within-country heterogeneity, we nd that in particular the young unem-
ployed would benet from broader UI coverage while the employed would face higher
social insurance contributions. Finally, our analysis shows that a common EMU-UI
system with contingent benets would lead to less cross-country redistribution than
the baseline system as it would provide more targeted transfers to member states with
deteriorating labor market conditions. However, contingent benets can have undesir-
able side e¤ects such as a broken link between contribution and benet payments if
benets are not activated.
One should note that the simulations of the scally most integrated EMU-UI scheme
assume revenue-neutrality over the entire time span considered (200013), but not in
each period. This raises the issue of whether the EMU-UI would be allowed to issue
debt. In our calculations the EMU-UI would have produced a surplus in its early phase,
so that reserves would have been available to nance higher benets in the crisis. While
reserves would provide a bu¤er in the next recession, there is a concern that political
pressures would build up to prevent the accumulation of surpluses and, instead, let the
EMU-UI incur more and more debt until it needs to be bailed outby the member
states. Clearly, even though a balanced budget in each period would limit the ability
of the system to act as a scal stabilizer, an e¤ective debt limitation would be needed.
We should emphasize that our analysis has a number of limitations which should
be taken into account in the interpretation of the results. Most importantly, it is not
the objective of this paper to establish whether or not the introduction of an EMU-UI
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scheme is desirable in terms of overall welfare. Our analysis focuses on the nancial
ows implied by di¤erent unemployment insurance schemes and the ability of these
ows to act as an automatic stabilizer. In so far our analysis is purely positive, rather
than normative. In addition, we take economic behavior as given. If EMU-UI had
the desired stabilizing e¤ects, the nancial ows in the system would di¤er from those
calculated here; the redistributive e¤ects would probably be smaller. However, if the
moral hazard e¤ects dominated, the nancial ows from contributors to recipients
could also be larger. Adding behavioral e¤ects to the analysis is a promising subject
for future research.
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Figure 8: Stabilization e¤ects due to harmonization
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Figure 9: Stabilization e¤ects due to interregional and intertemporal smoothing
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Sources: AMECO, EU-LFS and own calculations based on EUROMOD. Note: Left y-axis shows interregional and
intertemporal smoothing in per cent of the change in employment income (see formula 3 in section 4.1). Smoothing
coe¢ cients are assigned a missing value in years with an absolute change in employment income smaller than 0.05 per
cent of GDP as coe¢ cients can be very large in those years. Right y-axis shows delta Y and delta SIC (in % of GDP).
Interregional smoothing = (Delta SIC EMU-UI no debt - Delta SIC Harmonized national UI) / Delta Y.
Intertemporal smoothing = (Delta SIC EMU-UI debt - Delta SIC EMU-UI no debt) / Delta Y.
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Table 5: Trigger for contingent benets
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii
AT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
BE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
CY 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
EE 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
GE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
GR 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
LV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
PT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
SI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SK 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii
AT 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
CY 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
EE 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
FI 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
FR 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
GE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GR 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
IE 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
IT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
LU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
LV 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
PT 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
SI 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
SK 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
SP 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: Years in which contingent benets are activated. Contingent scheme i): Benets are paid if unemployment rate
in a given member state in year t is at least 1 percentage point higher than in t-1 (one-year look-back period).
Contingent scheme ii): 2-year look-back period, i.e., benets are triggered if unemployment rate in year t is at least 1
percentage point higher than in t-1 OR t-2. Contingent scheme iii): 3-year look-back period, i.e., benets are triggered
if unemployment rate in year t is at least 1 percentage point higher than in t-1 OR t-2 OR t-3. Source: AMECO.
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A.2 Reweighting procedure for modeling (un)employment changes
In EUROMOD, the baseline household weights supplied with the national cross-sectional
databases have been calculated to adjust for sample design and/or di¤erential non-
response. In our empirical analysis, we follow the approach taken by Immvervoll et al.
(2006), Bargain et al. (2012) and Dolls et al. (2012) and employ reweighting techniques
to simulate a sample of repeated cross-sections for each EA member state over the pe-
riod 2000-13. We impute various labor force characteristics from the LFS micro data
based on 18 age-gender-education strata. For each subgroup-year cell, these are num-
ber of people in the labor force, unemployment rates, shares of short- and long-term
unemployed as well as coverage rates of national UI systems.
The 18 subgroups are dened according to the following socio-demographic charac-
teristics:
 gender
 age (<30, 3050, >50)
 education (low: not completed primary, primary and lower secondary; middle:
upper secondary and post secondary; high: tertiary).
(Un)employment changes over the period of analysis are modeled at the subgroup
level. An increase (a decrease) of the group-specic unemployment rate is computed
by increasing the weights of the unemployed (employed) in each subgroup while the
weights of the employed (unemployed) are decreased correspondingly, i.e., in e¤ect a
fraction of employed (unemployed) individuals is made unemployed (employed). Hence,
the size and composition of the labor force in each reweighted cross-section matches the
labor force as reected in the LFS both at the subgroup and aggregate level. Growth in
average earnings along the intensive margin, modeled in order to account for changes
in the tax base, is imputed from the AMECO-database.
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